In this paper, we propose new methods which detect tampered-TCP connections at edge routers and protect well-behaved TCP connections from tampered-TCP connections, which results in fairness among TCP connections. The proposed methods monitor the TCP packets at an edge router and estimate the window size or the throughput for each TCP connection. By using estimation results, the proposed methods assess whether each TCP connection is tampered or not and drop packets intentionally if necessary to improve the fairness amongst TCP connections. From the results of simulation experiments, we confirm that the proposed methods can accurately identify tampered-TCP connections and regulate throughput ratio between tampered-TCP connections and competing TCP Reno connections to about 1.
Introduction
Currently, most Internet traffic is carried by the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) [1] . The congestion control mechanism of TCP allows the Internet to provide fair and unstoppable services without any collapse due to an extreme traffic increase. The congestion control mechanism of TCP is defined by the RFC [2] , and its implementation in operating systems is based on this document. Therefore, if two users with different operating systems should share a bottleneck link in the network, each user can obtain a roughly fair throughput despite the minor implementation differences of the protocol in the two operating systems.
However, since TCP works at end hosts, it is easy for users to modify its behavior. This is especially the case for users with open source operating systems such as Linux [3] , [4] . Thus, there exists many kind of TCP variants created by malicious users that allow for higher than normal throughput [5] , [6] . In this paper, such modified TCPs are referred to as tampered-TCPs.
Generally, when modifications to TCP congestion control mechanisms are proposed, the effects of these modifications are compared with the original TCP Reno. Furthermore, for assessing the deployment path of the proposed † † The author is with Cybermedia Center, Osaka University, Toyonaka-shi, 560-0043 Japan.
a) E-mail: maruyama@ane.cmc.osaka-u.ac.jp b) E-mail: hasegawa@cmc.osaka-u.ac.jp c) E-mail: murata@ist.osaka-u.ac.jp DOI: 10.1093/ietcom/e91-b. 1.197 TCP, the performance when the proposed TCP and TCP Reno connections share the network bandwidth is evaluated [7] , [8] . However, malicious users can selfishly modify TCP behavior, focusing only on increasing their own throughput. When the population of tampered-TCP connections increases in a network, therefore, these tampered-TCP connections may unfairly occupy network bandwidth, causing normal TCP connections to suffer from low throughput.
On the other hand, such tampered-TCPs may not work well in the actual Internet environment. For example, by augmenting the increase ratio of the congestion window size, the number of packets that are simultaneously injected into the network increases rapidly. This results in increased packet loss due to congestion within the network, which leads to degraded throughput. Thus, a tampered-TCP may self-destruct, when its behavior causes it to send data packets more aggressively than normal TCP Reno connections.
In [9] , we evaluated the effects of the tampered-TCP on a network shared with normal TCP Reno connections. We focused on a tampered-TCP which changes the increase and decrease ratio of the congestion window size during the congestion avoidance phase without the SACK option [10] and we presented that there exists little region where the tampered-TCP without the SACK option can improve the throughput. However, it is not a reasonable to assume that a malicious user does not use the SACK option, and there are many recent operating systems that enable the SACK option as a default setting [11] - [13] . Thus, in this paper, we also evaluate the effects of tampered-TCP with the SACK option and show that it works quite effectively in large network parameter region. In other words, with SACK option, the tampered-TCP connection can obtain high throughput by depressing the throughput of competing TCP Reno connections. Since tampered-TCPs are TCP variants that are modified at the end hosts, additional mechanisms are needed in the network for protecting normal TCP Reno connections from tampered-TCP connections. One such possible location could be on the network routers.
In [14] , the authors proposed a router mechanism that controls UDP traffic to realize TCP-friendliness [15] . However, this mechanism is not intended to control TCP traffic. Since TCP traffic behaves adaptively in packet loss events, whereas UDP traffic does not change its transmission speed against the network congestion, a new mechanism for controlling TCP traffic is necessary. In addition, the authors of [14] do not specify how to estimate parameters used to calculate estimated throughput.
Copyright c 2008 The Institute of Electronics, Information and Communication Engineers
In this paper, therefore, we propose a new mechanism that maintains the fairness amongst TCP connections at edge routers, which protects the normal TCP Reno connections from tampered-TCP connections. There are two reasons why the proposed mechanism should be located at the edge routers and not at the core routers. The first reason is that the number of TCP connections passing through edge routers is smaller than through core routers, which results in lower processing overhead to monitor and control TCP connections. The second reason is that this prevents too many packets from tampered-TCP connections from entering the network.
The proposed mechanism estimates a window size or an average throughput for each TCP connection by monitoring the TCP packets at an edge router, and assess its tampering property based on the estimation results. In case of estimating window size (we call cwnd-based method in this paper), the increase ratio α and decrease ratio β of the congestion window size during the congestion avoidance phase are estimated. If the estimated α and β do not satisfy the conditions for achieving similar throughput for the normal TCP Reno connections, the TCP connection is assessed to be a tampered-TCP. On the other hand, in case of estimating throughput (throughput-based method in this paper), we obtain the average throughput of each TCP connection using the traditional per-flow network monitoring tools such as sFlow [16] and NetFlow [17] . The packet loss rate, RTT, and other parameters used for estimating a throughput when the TCP connection would be a TCP Reno are monitored. If the observed throughput is larger than the estimated throughput, the TCP connection is considered to be a tampered-TCP. For both methods, the packets belonging to a tampered-TCP connection are dropped intentionally at the edge router with an appropriate probability to regulate its throughput to the same value as the TCP Reno connections.
The proposed mechanism is evaluated by simulation experiments using ns-2 [18] . The throughput ratio is used as a metric of the fairness amongst TCP Reno and tampered-TCP connections. As well, the following three metrics are used to examine the performance of the proposed mechanism: the false negative ratio, the detection time of the tampered-TCP connections, and the false positive ratio. Based on the results of these evaluations, it was shown that the proposed mechanism can accurately identify tampered-TCP connections and regulate the throughput ratio between tampered-TCP connections and competing TCP Reno connections to about 1.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2, the effects of a tampered-TCP with SACK option is evaluated using the simulation experiments. In Sect. 3, the design of the proposed mechanism that maintains the fairness amongst TCP connections at edge routers is described. In Sect. 4, the evaluation results of proposed mechanism by simulation experiments are presented. Finally, in Sect. 5, the conclusions and future works are presented.
Effects of Tampered-TCP
In this section, we briefly demonstrate the effects of a tampered-TCP with the SACK option. Figure 1 depicts the network model that is used for simulation experiments with ns-2 [18] . The network model consists of sender and receiver hosts using TCP Reno connections, sender and receiver hosts using tampered-TCP connections, two routers (R A and R B ) with a droptail buffer, and links interconnecting the hosts and routers. The bandwidth of the link between the router R A and the router R B is µ Mbps, the buffer size at the router R A is B packets, the propagation delay between the sender and receiver hosts is τ sec, the bandwidth of the links between the tampered-TCP hosts and routers is µ T Mbps, and that between the TCP Reno hosts and the routers is µ R Mbps. There are n T tampered-TCP connections and n R TCP Reno connections. It is assumed that the sender hosts have an infinite amount of data to send and continue transmitting as much data as is allowed by their congestion window sizes.
We focus on a tampered-TCP with the SACK option which changes the increase ratio α of the congestion window size and keeps the decrease ratio β to 0.5. The network model shown in Fig. 1 is used with µ R = µ T = 100 Mbps, µ = 100 Mbps, τ = 20 msec, B = 667 packets, and the packet size is 1500 bytes. We have done extensive simulation experiments with various network parameters, and we have confirmed that the overall characteristics of tampered TCP remains unchanged in other network conditions than those shown in this Section. The simulation time is 60 seconds. Figure 2 shows the change in the absolute value of the throughput as a function of α when the number of TCP connections is set at 10 and 30. For each case, we plot the results of three situations: no tampered-TCP connection, 10% of all the TCP connections are tampered-TCP without the SACK option, and 10% of all the TCP connections are tampered-TCP with the SACK option. This figure shows that the fairness is kept in case of no tampered-TCP connection. In addition, the tampered-TCP connections without the SACK option cannot obtain much higher throughput than competing TCP Reno connections. However, the tampered-TCP connections with the SACK option obtain quite a high throughput as α increases which results in depressing the throughput of competing TCP Reno connections. The tampered-TCP is modified by malicious users at end hosts. Therefore, a mechanism is needed to protect normal TCP connections from tampered-TCP connections in the network. Such a mechanism should be located on the network routers. Figure 3 depicts the overall behavior of the proposed mechanism. By monitoring the TCP packets at an edge router, the proposed mechanism detects tampered-TCP connections using estimation results. To protect TCP Reno connections, the proposed mechanism intentionally drops packets of the tampered-TCP connections at an appropriate probability that regulates its throughput to equal that of normal TCP Reno connections in time of congestion.
Design of Proposed Mechanism
Note that the proposed mechanism is not based on perflow queueing. It can be combined with Weighted RED (WRED) mechanism which is equipped in many commercial router products, since the proposed mechanism only sets the packet discarding probabilities for tampered-TCP connections to maintain fairness amongst connections. We also note that the regulating mechanism for tampered-TCP connections is only activated on congested routers.
We propose two methods which differ in the metric for assessing the tampering property of TCP connections: a window size and an average throughput. We refer to them as cwnd-based method and throughput-based method, respectively. In the following subsections, a detailed description is given of each method, in terms of estimation mechanism of the window size and the average throughput, conditions for assessing the tampering property, and algorithms for determining the target packet discarding probabilities.
Cwnd-Based Method
The cwnd-based method monitors the TCP packets passing through the edge router and continuously estimates the window size of each TCP connection. In addition, the increase ratio α and decrease ratio β for the TCP connection for changing the congestion window size during the congestion avoidance phase are estimated based on changes in the estimated window sizes. If the estimated α and β indicate that a TCP connection unfairly obtains higher throughput than competing TCP Reno connections, the TCP connection is assessed as a tampered-TCP connection and its throughput is regulated using an appropriate packet discarding probability.
Estimating the Window Size of a TCP Connection
Generally, TCP sends packets in a window in bursty fashion. Therefore, the interval between the last packet of a window and the first packet of the next window is the longer than intervals between packets in a burst. By detecting the boundary of two windows divided by such a long interval, the proposed mechanism counts the number of packets sent by the sender TCP in each window and estimates the change in the window size.
For that purpose, the proposed mechanism records the arrival intervals of every two successive packets in a TCP connection and observes the change in the arrival intervals. To observe the change in the arrival intervals, algorithm presented in [19] , which proposes a general method to detect an abrupt change in observed values is used. This algorithm can be described with the following equation:
This equation calculates the exponential moving average of the squared value of difference between the latest observed value y k and its averageȳ using a smoothing parameter δ (0 ≤ δ ≤ 1). If this value is larger than a threshold h, an abrupt change is said to occur. In the proposed mechanism, y k corresponds to the k-th arrival interval andȳ corresponds to the average value of the arrival intervals. Detecting the abrupt change in the arrival intervals, an estimated value of the window size can be derived. Using this mechanism, we can obtain roughly one estimation result of the window size of a TCP connection per RTT.
On the other hand, [20] proposes a mechanism to estimate the RTT of TCP connections at routers in the network. By estimating the RTT using this mechanism, a router counts the number of arriving packets in an RTT and estimates the window size of each TCP connection. This method seems to be useful for network situations where the boundary of the window of TCP connections is hard to detect because of short RTTs or large window sizes. However, this method was not used in this paper, since it requires knowing a precise RTT value for each TCP connection. One of the advantages of the cwnd-based method that is proposed here is that there is no need to estimate the RTT for each TCP connection.
Estimating α and β
If the window size of a TCP sender decreases after a packet loss event, the estimated window size at the edge router also decreases. Here, the interval from just after a decrease of the estimated window size caused by a packet loss event to just before the decrease of the estimated window size caused by the next packet loss event is denoted as a cycle. The estimated window size at the j-th RTT of the c-th cycle is denoted as W e (c, j).
To obtain α, we calculate α e (c, j), which is the difference between two successive estimated window sizes as follows:
At the end of each cycle, the average value of α e (c, j) is derived as follows:
where l(c) is the number of samples of the estimated window size in the c-th cycle. For the current estimation value of α, the exponentially weighted moving average (EWMA) of α e (c), which is denoted as α e , is derived as follows:
where γ α is a smoothing parameter. For β, β e (c), which is the estimated value of β in the c-th cycle, from the rate of decrease of the window size in a packet loss event is calculated using:
Thus, for the current estimation value of β, the EWMA of β e (c), which is denoted as β e , is derived as follows:
where γ β is a smoothing parameter.
Estimating Packet Loss Rate
The cwnd-based method estimates the packet loss rate using the information administered by the Management Information Base (MIB) [21] at the edge router. MIB normally stores the number of packets passed through the router and the number of dropped packets at the router. Therefore, by assuming that the edge router implementing the proposed mechanism is a bottleneck, the packet loss rate derived from the MIB information is roughly the same as the packet loss rate that TCP connections passing through the router actually experience. Note that when a different router in the network is the bottleneck, this method underestimates the packet loss rate of TCP connections. This lowers the accuracy of the control mechanism proposed in this subsection. In this case, a different method, such as that proposed in [22] , for estimating a packet loss rate for each TCP connection should be deployed, whereas we utilize the MIB-based method for its simplicity. For future work, we plan to compare the MIB-based method and the method in [22] based on the estimation accuracy and the processing overhead.
When tampered-TCP connections with larger increase ratio of the congestion window size co-exist with normal TCP Reno connections, the packet loss rate at the router increases. In [9] , we showed that the number of dropped packets in a tampered-TCP connection is proportional to its increase ratio, α, of the congestion window size. Therefore, the proposed mechanism should estimate the packet loss rate when all the TCP connections passing through the router are supposed to be TCP Reno. Thus, the target packet discarding probability for tampered-TCP connections can be determined.
The number of dropped packets at the router is denoted as n d , the number of all the packets which passed through the router is denoted as n a , and the average value of α e for all the TCP connections passing through the router is denoted as A e . Thus, the packet loss rate, p, can be estimated as follows:
A e p can be averaged, using the following EWMA calculations:
where γ d is a smoothing parameter. Note new values for p andp are calculated whenever a new value for the target packet discarding probability is determined.
Assessing the Tampering Property
In [7] , the authors extended the equation in [23] for an average throughput of a TCP connection for arbitrary values of α and β. They also showed that when the following equation is satisfied, the TCP connection obtains the same throughput as a normal TCP Reno connections:
By using the above equation, a TCP connection is said to be a tampered-TCP when its α e and β e satisfy the following equation:
where γ w (0 < γ w < 1) is a parameter that takes into consideration the estimation error of α e and β e . Note that the above assessment of the tampering property of the TCP connection is repeated whenever r w packets of the TCP connection arrives at the router. r w is given by r w = k w p where k w is a positive integer parameter.
Setting the Target Packet Discarding Probability
The proposed mechanism sets a target packet discarding probability p for each TCP connection assessed as a tampered-TCP to regulate its throughput to roughly the same as TCP Reno connections. In setting p , the focus is on the change in the congestion window size of a TCP Reno connection in the situation where all the TCP connections passing through the router are supposed to be TCP Reno. Here, the TCP Reno connection in such a situation is called a pseudo TCP Reno connection. The p is determined so as to equalize the throughput of the regulated tampered-TCP connection with that of the pseudo TCP Reno connection. Figure 4 shows the typical changes in the congestion window sizes of the pseudo TCP Reno connection and the tampered-TCP connection with the target packet discarding probability. The number of packets that a pseudo TCP Reno sender sends in a cycle is 1 p . Because this value is equal to the shaded area in Fig. 4(a) , the following equation is satisfied:
where W R is the estimated window size of the pseudo TCP Reno connection at the beginning of the cycle. For the tampered-TCP connection, a similar equation is satisfied:
where W T is the estimated window size of the tampered-TCP connection at the beginning of the cycle. Therefore, when the throughput of the tampered-TCP connection is identical to the pseudo TCP Reno connection, we obtain the following equation:
From Eqs. (2)- (4), the target packet discarding probability can be obtained as follows:
Note that the target packet discarding probability is calculated whenever u w packets of the TCP connection arrive at the router. u w is given by u w = 1 p .
Throughput-Based Method
The throughput-based method monitors the throughput of each TCP connection and regulates the tampered-TCP connections at regular intervals. This interval is called as the control interval. In each control interval, an observed throughput is derived based on the information from traditional traffic monitoring tools like sFlow [16] and NetFlow [17] . In addition, network parameters, such as RTT, packet loss ratio, and so on, are estimated in order to determine the throughput, assuming that the TCP connection is a TCP Reno. This estimated throughput is called as an estimated throughput. If the observed throughput is larger than the estimated throughput, then the TCP connection is said to be not TCP Reno, but a tampered-TCP, and its throughput is regulated based on a target packet discarding probability.
Setting the Control Interval
The control interval is the time for n I (i) packets arriving at the router. n I (i) is derived as follows:
where p(i) is an estimated packet loss rate at the beginning of the i-th control interval and k t is a positive integer parameter.
Calculating the Observed Throughput
Traffic monitoring tools generally store the total bytes of packets passed through the router and the traffic monitoring time for each flow passing through the router.
The total number of bytes in the i-th control interval is denoted as b(i), the length of the i-th control interval is denoted as t(i) and the observed throughput in the i-th control interval is denoted as T o (i). Then T o (i) is given by the following equation:
T o (i) = b(i) t(i)
Calculating the Estimated Throughput
The equation proposed in [23] which estimates the throughput of a TCP connection uses the following parameters: packet size, delayed ACK option value, RTT, retransmission timeout, and packet loss rate. To calculate the estimated throughput if it is assumed that the TCP connection is a TCP Reno connection, all the parameters are estimated as follows:
• Packet size The traffic monitoring tools store the amount of traffic that arrives at the router in both units of packets and bytes. The total number of packets in the i-th control interval is denoted as n(i), and the estimated packet size is denoted as s e (i). Then s e (i) can be calculated as follows:
• The delayed ACK option value The ACK sequence number of the j-th ACK packet in the i-th control interval is denoted as a(i, j). Using the difference between two ACK sequence numbers, the estimated value of the delayed ACK option del e (i, j) is given by:
The average number of the del e (i, j) in the i-th control interval is denoted as del e (i). del e (i) is derived as follows:
where n b is the number of samples of the estimated delayed ACK option values in the i-th control interval.
Here, all duplicate ACK packets and ACK packets just after the duplicate ACK packets are ignored in the calculation, because the ACK sequence numbers of such ACK packets are not appropriate for determining the delayed ACK option value.
• RTT Although many different kinds of mechanisms have been proposed to estimate the RTT in past papers [24] - [26] , the mechanism proposed in [20] , which utilizes TCP's timestamp option [27] , is used in this paper. This mechanism estimates the RTT as follows. The sender transmits a TCP data packet dp 1 with timestamp ts 1 . It arrives at the router at time m 1 . The receiver responds with an ACK packet ap 1 with timestamp ts 2 and the echo ts 1 . The router recognizes ts 1 in both the packet dp 1 and ap 1 , then makes an association between the two packets. On receiving the ACK packet ap 1 , the sender transmits a new data packet dp 2 with timestamp ts 3 and the echo ts 2 . The router receives the packet dp 2 at time m 2 and recognizes ts 2 in both the packet ap 1 and dp 2 , then makes an association between the packet ap1 and dp2. With three associated packets, the router estimates the RTT using m 1 and m 2 . The j-th estimated RTT in the i-th control interval rtt e (i, j) is given by:
The average value of the rtt e (i, j) in the i-th control interval is derived as follows:
where n r is the number of samples of the estimated RTTs in the i-th control interval.
• Retransmission timeout [28] recommends that four times of the RTT be used as an estimated value of the retransmission timeout. In this paper, this method is used to estimate the retransmission timeout rto e (i) as:
rto e (i) = 4rtt e (i)
• Packet loss rate The estimated packet loss rate is derived in a manner similar to the cwnd-based method. However, because the throughput-based method does not estimate the increase ratio α of the congestion window size of each TCP connection, the packet loss rate observed when all the TCP connections passing through the router are supposed to be TCP Reno cannot be estimated. Thus, packet loss rate p(i) is simply calculated from n d (i) and n a (i) as follows:
When the number of co-existing TCP connections is small, this equation overestimates the packet loss rate of TCP connections. However, the number of TCP connections passing through the router increases and the ratio of tampered-TCP connections relatively decreases, the effect of the overestimation becomes small. The estimated packet loss rate is smoothed according to the following EWMA calculation:
Finally, the estimated throughput T e (i) in the i-th control interval is given by:
+rto e (i)min 1,3
Assessing the Tampering Property
The throughput-based method assesses a TCP connection as tampered-TCP if its T o (i) and T e (i) in the i-th control interval satisfy the following equation:
where γ t (0 < γ t ) is a parameter that accounts for error in estimating T o (i) and T e (i). Note that the above assessment of the tampering property of the TCP connection is repeated for every control interval, which reduces the effect of assessment misses.
Setting the Target Packet Discarding Probability
Since the throughput of a TCP connection is proportional to the inverse of the square root of the packet loss rate [15] , this can be used to determine the target packet discarding probability p (i) in the i-th control interval. Based on this property, p (i) is given by:
Simulation Experiments of Proposed Mechanism
In this section, the simulation results to evaluate the performance of the proposed mechanism described in Sect. 3 are presented. The control parameters for the cwnd-based method are set as δ = 0.5, h = 0.0001, γ α = 0.6, γ β = 0.6, γ d = 0.6, γ w = 0.1, and k w = 4. The parameter h is determined according to the minimum value of inter-arrival times of incoming packets, which is calculated from the link bandwidth and packet size. Therefore we use this value to judge the boundary of two successive windows. The other parameters are set by parameter tuning to be suitable for this network condition. The control parameters for the throughputbased method are set as γ l = 0.6, γ t = 2, and k t = 6. These parameters are set by parameter tuning to be suitable for this network condition. The simulation model is shown in Fig. 1 where µ R = µ T = 100 Mbps, µ = 50 Mbps, τ = 20 msec, B = 333 packets, n T = 1, n R = 20, and the packet size is set to 1500 bytes. We set a smaller value to the bandwidth of bottleneck link than that of Fig. 2 so as to confirm that the proposed mechanism can detect and control only the tampered-TCP connection even in a situation where it is more difficult for the tampered-TCP connection to work well. The simulation time is 70 seconds. In first 10 seconds, only TCP Reno connections transmit data, and after 10 seconds, the tampered-TCP connection starts transmission. We use the average values of the evaluation metrics of the last 60 seconds. The performance of the proposed mechanism is evaluated when α, the increase ratio of the congestion window size of the tampered-TCP connections, takes values in the interval [1, 20] while β, the decrease ratio of the congestion window size of the tampered-TCP connection, takes values in the interval [0.5,1.0]. We change the α by 1 and β by 0.1. The throughput ratio is used as an evaluation metric. It is defined as:
In addition, following three metrics are used to examine the performance of the proposed mechanism: the false negative ratio, the detection time of tampered-TCP connections, and the false positive ratio. The false negative ratio is defined as the ratio that the proposed mechanism fails to detect tampered-TCP connections. The detection time is defined as the time that the proposed mechanism takes to detect tampered-TCP connections. The false positive ratio is defied as the ratio that TCP Reno connections are once assessed as tampered-TCP in the simulation. Besides, the bottleneck link is always congested in the following simulations. Detailed algorithm and evaluation of the mechanism to judge the congestion level is one of our future works. One possible solution is to set the threshold value for the queue length at the router buffer with the proposed mechanisms to monitor the link utilization. Figure 5 plots the change in the throughput ratio of no control, the cwnd-based method and the throughput-based method. This figure shows that the both methods keep the throughput ratio about 1 for almost all the parameters.
Throughput Ratio
In other words, in time of congestion, the proposed mechanism achieves the fairness between the tampered-TCP and TCP Reno connections. In addition, TCP variants that maintain the fairness between TCP Reno do not become a candidate for throughput control by the proposed mechanism from the following two reasons: (1) The proposed mechanism is active only when the network is congested, so the aggressive behavior of such TCPs for utilizing unused bandwidth is not regulated. (2) Such TCPs will behave fairly against co-existing TCP Reno when congested, so the proposed mechanism does not work in such case.
False Negative Ratio and Detection Time
Figures 6 and 7 show changes in the false negative ratio and the detection time for the cwnd-based method and throughput-based method. In the region around (α, β) = (1, 0.5), which corresponds to TCP Reno's increase and decrease ratio of the congestion window size, the false negative ratio in the cwnd-based method is nearly 1. This means that the cwnd-based method does not assess a normal TCP Reno connection as a tampered-TCP connection. In addition, in the region where the tampering property of the tampered-TCP connections is weak, the false negative ratio becomes high. This is because the parameter γ w is used to account for the estimation error in Eqs. (1), which causes the tampered-TCP connections in this region to occasionally be assessed as normal TCP Reno connections. In case of the throughput-based method, the false negative ratio around (α, β) = (1, 0.5) is nearly 0. This is because a normal TCP connection during the slow start phase is sometimes misassessed as a tampered-TCP. However, the effects of the misassessment are small as we will mention later. One of the solutions to this problem is setting a longer control interval than the other ones for the first assessment of the tampering property of each TCP connection. In the other region, tampered-TCP connections are detected at almost 100% for both methods. Figure 7 shows that both methods take about 2 seconds to detect the tampered-TCP connections. This is calculated as follows. In this paper, we set the packet size s = 1500 byte. The average window size of one connection w a is :
The round trip time rtt is given by :
The number of packets in one control interval is derived as : The number of window in one control interval is:
Therefore, the detection time t d is given as follows:
By assigning the value used in the simulation, we can get 4 as the detection time. Though his value is different from the simulation results, we can assume that the slow start phase at the beginning of the tampered-TCP connection shorten the detection time. Therefore, the detection time is about 2. The same reason as the throughput-based method. Currently, when ISP monitors and detects connections that use large bandwidth, the MIB information is mainly used, and the typical update interval of the MIB information is 5 minutes. Thus, it can be said that the proposed mechanism detects tampered-TCP connections much faster. Figure 8 depicts the false positive ratio for the cwnd-based method and throughput-based method. This figure shows that the false positive ratio of both methods increases as the tampering property of tampered-TCP connections becomes stronger. This can be explained as follows. The tampered-TCP modeled in this paper increases its congestion window size rapidly as its tampering property becomes stronger, which leads to unstable changes in the congestion window size and in the throughput of the competing TCP Reno connections. This causes an estimation error for α and β in the cwnd-based method, and for the observed throughput and the estimated throughput in the throughput-based method.
False Positive Ratio
In addition, in case of the throughput-based method with a short control interval, a normal TCP connection during the slow start phase is sometimes misassessed as a tampered-TCP. One of the solutions to this problem is setting a longer control interval than the other ones for the first assessment of the tampering property of each TCP connection. However, in the case of false positive errors, the throughput of misassessed TCP Reno connection does not decrease so largely. This is shown by Table 1 , which presents the throughput and throughput ratio of misassessed TCP Reno connections and successfully-assessed TCP Reno connections. This result means the following things: The parameter tuning for various network environments should be one of our future work. However, the proposed mechanism periodically checks the tampered characteristics of TCP connections, temporary estimation errors can be fixed in the following intervals. Therefore, it can be said that the proposed mechanism sometimes misassesses TCP Reno connections as tampered-TCP, however, the effects of this misassessment are small. Therefore, it can be said that the proposed mechanism sometimes misassesses TCP Reno connections as tampered-TCP. However, the effects of this misassessment are small.
Effectiveness in Case of Many Tampered-TCP Connections
Though we think it is unlikely that about 50% of all the connections are tampered-TCP in the actual network situation, we check the performance of the proposed mechanism in such a situation. We show the simulation results in Fig. 9 to evaluate the performance of the proposed mechanism when 50% of TCP connections are tampered. In this simulation, we set γ t = 1. This result shows that the cwnd-based method appropriately control the tampered-TCP connections in the region where α is small. This is because the tampered-TCP modeled in this paper increases its congestion window size rapidly as its tampering property becomes stronger, which leads to unstable changes in the congestion window size and results in the estimation errors. It is one of our future works to improve the accuracy of the cwnd-based method when α of the tampered-TCP connections is large.
As for throughput-based method, the tampered-TCP connections are controlled properly when β is smaller than 1. In this case, tampered-TCP connections occupy the bandwidth in a rotation-fashion, so such connections decreases the throughput of TCP Reno connections before it is detected and controlled by the throughput-based method. It is one of our future works to improve the accuracy of the throughput-based method when β of the tampered-TCP connections is about 1.
Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed a new mechanism at edge routers to protect normal TCP connections from tampered-TCP connections. The proposed mechanism estimates a window size or an average throughput of each TCP connection passing through the edge router by monitoring TCP packets, and assesses its tampering property based on the estimation results and regulates the throughput of tampered-TCP connections by dropping incoming packets at an appropriate probability. By results of the simulation experiments, we presented that the proposed mechanism regulates the throughput ratio about 1 and achieve the fairness amongst TCP connections. Our future works are: (1) Investigating the performance of the proposed mechanism in the actual Internet environment. (2) Simulations using another TCP variant, which is compound TCP included in Windows Vista, as a well-behaved TCP. 
